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guilty of murder at common law. This is so in the United States
(except in Texas), by:
A. Murder caused through a guilty human agent, or
B. Murder caused through an innocent human agent, or
C. Murder caused by compulsion.
III. The attempt at suicide is a misdemeanor at common law.
A. This is so in the United States today where the common law
is followed.
B. Where suicide is not considered a crime, the attempt at sui-
cide is :
1. Made a crime by statute, or
2. Is not a crime.
IV. Conspiracy to commit suicide is a separate crime.
V. Solicitation to commit suicide is a separate crime.
VI. There is no legal duty to interfere to prevent the commission of suicide
except in cases where one person sustains to another the legal rela-
tion of protector.
VII. Death of another person caused in the attempt to commit suicide is
murder.
Richard Wolfrom,
ELECTION OF REMEDIES IN PENNSYLVANIA
This note is provoked because of the lack of adequate indexing on the
subject of Election of Remedies in the Pennsylvania digests. An article in
Corpus Juris has proven to be of invaluable aid in its preparation, and so it is
only fitting that the definition therein contained should be iterated. "Election
of remedies has been defined to be the right to choose, or the act of choosing
between different actions or remedies, where plaintiff has suffered one species
of wrong from the act complained of.''
No definition, unfortunately, can be all-inclusive; at best it can serve
merely as a guide. Immediately we are forced to restrict the one above by
saying that the term, election of remedies, has been generally limited to a
choice by a party between inconsistent remedial rights. A quotation from
Patterson v. Swan2 states the proposition thus:
120 C. J., sec. 1. p. 2.
29 Serg. and R. 16 (1822),
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"It is well settled, that the doctrine of election holds only where the
remedies are inconsistent with each other; and here they are not so.
I.... It is perfectly clear, therefore, that the plaintiff might pursue
the principal or his surety: or both at the same time."
The defendant had entered bail to entitle himself to a stay of execution under
the provisions of the Act of 21st. March, 1806, and the plaintiff, after the ex-
piration of the cesset, issued a fieri facias and levied on defendant's real estate.
On the return of this writ the plaintiff issued a scire facias against the bail
upon his recognizance and it was held that the plaintiff could pursue either or
both of these remedies, they being consistent, though he could receive but
one satisfaction.
Thus we learn that the doctrine involved applies only where the alter-
native remedies are at odds, or inconsistent with each other; and not where
they are concurrent. The question as to what remedies are consistent and
what are inconsistent with each other will be discussed further on.
At once the query is propounded, why is an election ever required? Is
there any fundamental reason behind the doctrine? The answer may best be
given by an illustration from the case of Ketcham v. Davis.' A lease of per-
sonal property gave the plaintiff, the lessor, the right, in default of payment
(which payment was to be made in two unequal instalments) to retake posses-
sion of the property or to recover the full price. The defendant (lessee) was
in default on the first payment. The plaintiff pursued both alternatives.
What was the result? When the plaintiff caused judgment to be entered for
the unpaid balance, he considered the lease to be still in existence and
acknowledged the title to be in the defendant. When later the plaintiff retook
possession, he thereby rescinded the lease. In the first instance he affirmed
the lease; in the second he disaffirmed it. The consequence of his procedure
was a reliance on theories which cannot stand together. A party cannot
affirm and disaffirm at the same time. The court said :
"The established rule of law governing the enforcement of such
contracts is that the so-called lessor, on default, can adopt either remedy,
but they are not to be deemed cumulative; in other words, he could not
take both unless it was plainly expressed in the contract or a necessary
implication from its terms."
Another illustrative case is that of Star Drilling Machine Co. v. Richards' in
which a contract provided that payments for merchandise delivered were to be
made from time to time, the title thereto to remain in the seller until a certain
amount had been paid. Sometime later the seller retook possession of the
331 Pa. Super. Ct. 583 (1906).
4272 Pa. 383 (1922).
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property and so his right to receive future payments at once ceased.5 In
Piersol v. Neill' the court said:
"As a general rule, inconsistent remedies cannot exist at one and
the same time, to redress a wrong, either in tort or on contract."
We have seen where the remedies are consistent, the doctrine of election
does not apply. Thus it becomes incumbent upon us to discern what remedies
the courts consider to be consistent remedies. The case of Patterson v. Swan,
supra, is a good illustration. The language of Floyd v. Browne' is especially
helpful in explaining the holding of the Patterson case:
"Separate actions against a number who are severally liable for the
same thing, or against the same defendant on distinct securities for the
same debt or duty, are consistent, being concurrent remedies." (italics
ours)
If a creditor accepts a promissory note for the debt, he can maintain, at the
same time, an action both on the original debt and one on the note, "unless he
(defendant) can show, upon trial, to the satisfaction of a jury, that the orig-
inal debt was extinguished by the notes," Alexander v. Righter." A slightly
more, difficult situation is presented in Holt v. McWilliams" in which the ven-
dee brought an action at law to recover the purchase price paid for land. This
he discontinued and then brought the present bill for specific performance. An
objection was made that these are inconsistent remedies and so the plaintiff
cannot maintain the second one, but the court dismissed the objection in this
fashion :
"The action at law was discontinued and the costs paid. It was in
fact a suit based upon thi very contract which is now the basis of the
decree for specific performance. The suit was founded on an obligation
of the defendant to perform his agreement to convey. The two pro-
ceedings are not inconsistent. It is true, pending both, the plaintiff
might have been driven to elect between them. He, however, discon-
tinued the first and relies now solely on his right to specific perform-
ance."o
No general rule can be deduced from these cases. A party must scrutinize
each situation carefully and ask himself, if he discovers a choice of remedy,
"Should I pursue both of them, would the underlying theory on which I rely
sSee also Elliot to Use v. Douglass, 104 Pa. Super. Ct. 399 (1931); 37 A. L. R. 91; 58 A.
L. R. 309n; Auto Security Co. v. Canelli. 80 Pa. Super. Ct. 43 (1922).
063 Pa. 420 (1869).
71 Rawle 120 (1829).
821 Pa. Dist. 842 (1911). The same case was reversed on other grounds in 240 Pa. 22
(1913).
921 Pa. Super. Ct. 137 (1902).D
lAccord. Wasserman v. Steinman, 304 Pa. 150, 155 (1931); 26 A. L. R. 116n.
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for my relief in each case be the same?" In other words, is each remedy
predicated upon the contract I have made, or is each in disaffirmance of it;
am I affirming in both, or disaffirming in both? Judge Gibson said that
for remedies to be consistent they must be so, not only in purpose but in
kind." It may generally be said that where there is joint or several or joint
and several liability, a plaintiff may sue all individually at the same time. The
same holds true in principal and surety cases; or where one defendant has
bound himself for the same thing in different ways.
The result of employing consistent remedies is this : the bringing of the
actions and the pursuing of them to judgments are not bars, but satisfaction
of one is a bar to the others and is a satisfaction of all, 12 The court in
Floyd v. Browne, supra, thus tersely states the proposition :
"Trespass is, in its nature, joint and several; and in separate actions
against joint trespassers, being consistent with each other, nothing but
actual satisfaction by one will discharge the rest." (italics ours)
Schwartz u. Lawrence" was a case in which an attachment under the Act of
1869 issued, although an action for goods sold and delivered was pending at
that time. It was held that the two remedies, although for the same cause,
were not inconsistent "because they look to the accomplishment of the same
purpose," and while twc recoveries may be had, "there can be but one satis-
faction."
We turn now to a discussion of what remedies are inconsistent. The
most general rule that can be laid down is that a party cannot affirm and dis-
affirm at the same time," whether it be a contract, or a deed, or any other
type of obligation. All actions which proceed upon the theory that the title to
property is in plaintiff are inconsistent with those which proceed upon the
theory that title is in defendant. In conditional sale cases in which the ven-
dor retakes the property first, he has elected, and cannot thereafter recover
the price.15 An interesting case is that of Dick v. Gaskill," in which the court
said :
where there is a contract for the performance of cer-
tain things, and the party binds himself in a penalty for the perform-
"Potts' Appeal, 5 Pa. 500 (1847).
"2Brennan et al. v. Huber, 112 Pa. Super. Ct. 299 (1934) is the latest and best utterance
of our courts on this subject. In an action of trespass against a master to recover damages
for personal injuries caused by a servant's negligence, the record established that the. same
plaintiff had recovered a judgment against the servant which had not been satisfied. It was
held that the former action was not a bar. See also the cases cited therein.
1112 Phila. 181 (1877).
"4Geiser Mfg. Co. v. Crissinger, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 46 (1895); Share v. Anderson, 7 S. & R.
(1821).
'5Kelly Springfield Road Roller Co. v. Schlimine, 220 Pa. 413 (1908); Campbell Printing
Press and Mfg. Co. v. Hickok, 140 Pa. 290 (1891).
162 Whart. 183 (1837).
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ance, the party complaining of the breach of such contract has his elec-
tion either to bring debt for the penalty, or case for the breach of con-
tract: and in the latter case may recover even beyond the amount of the
penalty in damages; and where the word penalty is specifically used, it
is not in the nature of liquidated damages, but merely as a security.""
In Jacob v. Groff'8 there was a bailment lease of a piano, providing for a $50
quarterly rental until $350 was paid, when title should pass to the lessee. By
the terms of the agreement, the lessee gave-a note for $350 payable in three
months, on which $50 was to be paid, the note surrendered, and a new one for
$300 was to be given and so on until all was paid. The first note was dis-
counted by a bank for the bailor before maturity, and at maturity it was not
paid. Suit was brought by the bank and a compromise made by a payment
of cash and notes to the bailor. The bailee then sold the piano to another
person. The present suit was in replevin by the assignee of the bailor against
the purchaser from the bailee, and it was held that the action of the bailor in
having the note discounted, thereby putting it out of his power to comply with
the terms of the lease, terminated the contract, and that his election had been
made by allowing the suit on the note for the whole debt. The court said :
"The bailor had the undoubted right to take the piano into his own
possession, under the terms of the bailment, but, having allowed the
holder of the note to bring suit for the whole amount and, therefore,
hold the bailee as debtor therefor, he lost the right to take possession of
the piano, which was not regained, unless by express agreement be-
tween the parties."
The plaintiff had a choice of trover, trespass or assumpsit in Garrison v.
Bryant.1 He chose the former and so was bound by all the incidents of and
attaching to it. He elected his remedy and was bound by the said election.2"
The most important incident attaching to the doctrine, where the remedies
are inconsistent, is that it is the election itself which constitutes the bar to a
different remedy, differing decidedly in this respect from those situations in
which the remedies are concurrent. This is true although one remedy is at
law and the other in equity.21
While there is no specific judicial utterance in Pennsylvania, it seems safe
to say, by implication, that an election can exist only where there is a choice
1TSee also New Holland Turnpike Co. v. Lancaster County, 71 Pa. 442 (1872); Biery v.
Steckel. 19 Pa. Super. Ct. 396 (1902).
1819 Pa. Super. Ct. 144 (1902).
1910 Phila. 474 (1873).
201t is of significance to note that because of the doctrine of the election of remedies, no
rules of the substantive law have been altered. Merely because a plaintiff often has a choice
of trespass or assumpsit for a given cause, does not mean that he always has an election. For
a good discussion of this point see Brandmeier v. Pond Creek Co., 229 Pa. 280 (1910).
21Holt v. McWilliams, 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 137 (1902).
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between two or more inconsistent remedies actually existing at the time the
election is made. The case of Fisher v. Lehigh, etc. R. Co.22 sustains this
proposition. A widow brought suit for the wrongful death of her husband
under the Pennsylvania Act. Later she also sued for the same thing in a
federal court under the federal act. The defendant, in the latter case, petitioned
the court, asking that the plaintiff be required to elect in which action she
would proceed, and that she be required to discontinue the other one and pay
the costs. It was held that the court had no power to grant the petition.
Each statute came from a different soverign power, exclusive within its own
domain. The two actions are separate. If decedent was killed while en-
gaged in interstate commerce, the federal act and jurisdiction applied, contra
if he was killed in intrastate commerce. The case of Reap v. Scranton"2 says
that there has been no conclusive election where a party prosecutes an action
based upon a remedial right which he erroneously supposes he has and is
defeated because of such error. The facts are these: the plaintiff instituted
proceedings to have damages assessed as if there had been a taking in the
exercise of the right of eminent domain and 'the action fell by reason of the
determination of the fact that there had not been such a taking as entitled
him to-have the damages assessed in that way. The court held that the
remedy of trespass or ejectment survived. The case was affirmed per curiam,
plaintiff having a verdict and judgment for $800 in trespass.
This doctrine of election is closely akin to estoppel and waiver, the latter
being the closer counterpart. Walter v. Graham24 is a case based upon an
oral contract. Defendant agreed to wrap, pack and crate in an expert and
proper manner certain household goods and furniture belonging to plaintiff,
and load them in a proper manner in a railway freight car for ship-
ment from Philadelphia to X. The goods were damaged and plain-
tiff had already recoverd $70 from the railroad company when she brought
this action. Plaintiff secured a verdict and defendant moved for judgment
n.o.v. In dismissing the motion the court said :
"The argument for judgment n.o.v. is based on the contention that
the plaintiff waived her claim against the defendant and estopped herself
from asserting the same because she secured $70 from the railroad com-
pany on account of her damage. The obligations of the railroad and
of the defendant in connection with the shipment of goods were separate
and distinct, and the question of waiver or estoppel is not involved."
Thus where a person has distinct remedies against different persons whose
obligations are separate and distinct, as distinguished from the master-servant,
principal-agent and joint tortfeasor relationship, even satisfaction of one
judgment will not bar a suit against the other.
2220 Pa. Dist. 444 (1911).
237 Pa. Super. Ct. 32 (1898).
2480 Pa. Super. Ct. 518 (1923).
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The most important single element connected with this whole doctrine is
how far one may proceed before he is bound by his election. The general
rule in the United States is that the mere bringing of an action bars the use
of any other inconsistent remedy. This, however, is not the Pennsylvania
rule. In this state the carrying of the action based upon one remedy through
to judgment is the bar to a subsequent inconsistent remedy. Holt v. Mc-
Williams, supra, is most often cited as authority for this proposition. It will
be remembered, however, that the court in the Holt case held that the two
remedies therein which caused the controversy were cofisistent with each
other. Thus it is submitted that the Holt case, technically, is of little value
for which it is most frequently relied upon. Wasserman v. Steinman,2" which
follows the Holt case, however, clears up the situation by saying that if one
remedy is discontinued, another one may be brought. The case of Bookwalter
v. Bookwalter must be confined to its own facts. The opinion indicates this,
thus the case has no effect upon the rule propounded. The rule laid down
therein is this: where a party had two remedies and, electing to follow one, in
agreement with opposing counsel, requested the court to make a decree in
conformance with such agreement, he cannot afterwards abandon such rem-
edy and invoke another ..... .. the question is not so much a matter
of remedy as a matter of good faith to the court." Portland Lumber Co. v.
KiehlT clinches the situation. Briefly the facts are these: A had the sheriff,
defendant, levy upon goods in the hands of B, which goods belonged to the
plaintiff. At the sheriff's sale, the plaintiff notified the bidders, in the pres-
ence of the sheriff, that the goods were his. After the sale, the plaintiff pro-
ceeded against the sheriff for the wrongful sale, and it was held that he was
not deemed, by his notice, to have elected his remedy against the purchasers.
The case of Floyd v. Browne, supra, was referred to in the opinion, which case
had the same facts except that the plaintiff therein had already obtained a
judgment against the plaintiff in the execution and one other of the defendants
before he brought assumpsit against the sheriff. It was held that he had made
his election :
"Although the judgment, perhaps, was worthless, having gone so
far there certainly was an election of remedy, and having selected one
source out of which to receive redress, and prosecuted it to judgment, he
could not then select the other remedy. 112
-
The Portland Lumber Co. case was reversed on other grounds in Hyde v.
Kiehl.- In this latter case, Floyd v. Browne was again referred to and the
following quotation contains the gist of the controversy:
Z5Supra, note 10.
2675 Pa. Super. Ct. 577 (1921).
2719 Pa. Co. Ct. 56A (1897).
2819 Pa. Co. Ct. 564, 566 (1897).
29183 Pa. 414 (1898).
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"But the basis in Floyd v. Browne is that by the judgment against
the trespasser the title to the goods was divested out of the former own-
er, the plaintiff, and he could not subsequently maintain any action
founded on that title, It was a debatable question in Floyd v. Browne
whether the title was fully divested by a judgment without satisfaction,
and in Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103, it was said that the
authorities on the subject are conflicting. But in Merrick's Estate, 5 W.
& S. 9, it was said that it was no longer an open question in this state:
'A judgment for the value of a chattel is placed on the same footing as an
actual satisfaction, and consequently divests the plaintiff's title'."
Further on in the opinion of Hyde v. Kiehl the court says:
"But while it is thus held that a judgment is per se a bar, no case has
been found which holds that anything less than a judgment shall have
that effect. The technical reason of divesting the title does not apply to
a notice such as was given in the present case, and we should be taking
a long doubtful step in advance of our previous decisions by holding
that such notice should operate as an estoppel."
Thus we have the situation as it exists in Pennsylvania. The Holt case,
supra, does say that a discontinuance plus a payment of costs is the proper
procedure when a change of remedy is desired, and it is submitted that this
method is the safest. With two suits pending at the same time, the defendant
may either demand an election or put in a plea in abatement to the second
one.
ELECTION BETWEEN ACTIONS AT LAW AND SUITS IN EQUITY
The mere commencement of an action at law or a suit in equity does not
constitute a conclusive election so as to preclude resorting to the other tribunal
to enforce the same cause of action after discontinuance. 0 On the other hand
it is true, as shown in Megahey v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Savings Fund
and Loan Ass'n:81
"Jurisdiction will not be taken in equity to retry on the same facts a
cause of action that has been decided in proceedings at law."
The same rule applies generally to courts of concurrent jurisdiction. Smith
v. XTfcClure$2 holds that where a party seeks relief in a court of equity and
insists on its jurisdiction, he cannot thereafter complain because the court
sustains his contention and disposes of the case upon its merits. The rule that
in cases of concurrent jurisdiction the court that first acquired jurisdiction
POCook v. Carpenter. 12 Pa. Dist. 483 (1903).
$1215 Pa. 351 (1906).
P2257 Pa. 168 (1917)t
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ousts the jurisdiction of the other has been applied where the first suit was. not
discontinued.33
There arises a point in this connection which has given some trouble to
the courts but now appears to be definitely settled. It is this-where a suit
on the identical cause is pending between the same parties at law, and the
plaintiff subsequently commences another one in equity, what course is open
to the defendant. Must he answer and then force plaintiff to elect which one
he will pursue, or is a plea of his pendens in abatment sufficient? J. Arnold in
Pa. Co. for Ins. etc. u. Phila. Nat'l Bank-4 dealt with the problem by saying
that the real question involved is :
"1 . . . . whether a plea lis pendens is a good plea in abate-
ment, or whether the defendant, who is sued first at law, must, when
subsequently sued in equity, for the same cause, file answer upon the
merits; and upon due reflection, I am of opinion, that the plea of lis
pendens is good, and that the defendant is not bound to answer upon
the merits before requiring the plaintiff to make an election which suit
he will pursue.
''35
The complementary situation is also the same, the case of Penn Bank v. Hop-
kins36 holding that the pendency of a suit in equity is a good plea in abatement
to a subsequent action at law brought for the same cause of action.
The older cases were the ones which brought doubt in the minds of judges
who had the question of pleas in abatment before them. In Pa. Co. for Ins.
etc. u. Phila. Nat'l Bank, supra, the court disposed of Brooke u. Phillips.,8 a
proceeding in equity:
"In Brooke v. Phillips, ...... on a motion to disallow a plea
of this nature, Judge Strong,. sitting at nisi prius, decided that 'it is only
another suit pending in equity that is pleadable. Though the rule in
former times was different, the course of practice has now been settled
to be this. If a plaintiff sues a defendant at the same time and for the
same cause, both at Common Law and in equity, the defendant, after
full answer put in, may apply to the court for an order that the plaintiff
make his election where he will proceed; but he cannot plead the pen-
dency of the suit at Common Law in bar of the suit in equity.' For this
33Tiemann's Estate. 23 Pa. Dist. 607 (1914), holding that, where a party brings an action
at law in the court of Common Pleas for damages for breach of contract, and subsequently
petitions the Orphans' Court for specific performance assuming that the jurisdiction is con-
current, the court that first acquired jurisdiction ousts the jurisdiction of the other.
863 Pa. Dist. 93 (1893), afllrmed 195 Pa. 34.
35Accord. Glunz v. Kauffman, 7 Phila. 459 (1870).
86111 Pa. 328 (1886).
7"his. of course, being before such pleas were abolished by the Practice Act of 1915, To-
day the pleading set up in the Practice Act must be followed.
s86 Phila. 392 (1867).
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he cites some of the authorities which I have referred to. Taking his
own language as it is written, he was undoubtedly right in saying that
a defendant cannot plead the pendency of a suit at Common Law in bar
of the suit in equity. But subsequent cases in our state decide that he
may plead lis pendens in abatement of another suit for the same cause,
and he is not compelled to file an answer upon the merits of the case."
The treatment of the subject of election of remedies in this note has, of
necessity, been general. The scattered cases leave great gaps in the law
which time alone will fill.
James Rick, 3rd.
